This paper discusses the regulatory requirement (Basel Committee, ECB-SSM and EBA) to measure financial institutions' major risks, for instance Market, Credit and Operational, regarding the choice of the risk measures, the choice of the distributions used to model them and the level of confidence. We highlight and illustrate the paradoxes and the issues observed implementing an approach over another and the inconsistencies between the methodologies suggested and the goal to achieve. This paper make some recommendations to the supervisor and proposes alternative procedures to measure the risks. 2 This paper has been written in a very particular period of time as most regulatory papers written in the past 20 years are currently being questioned by both practitioners and regulators themselves. Some distress or disarray has been observed among risk managers as most models required by the regulation were not consistent with their own objective of risk management. The enlightenment brought by this paper is based on an academic analysis of the issues engendered by some pieces of regulation and it has not for purpose to create any sort of polemic.
Introduction
The ECB-SSM 3 , the EBA 4 and the Basel Committee are currently reviewing the methodological framework of risk modelling. In this paper, we analyse some of the issues observed measuring the risks as prescribed that would be useful to address in the future regulatory documents.
Problematic
During the current crisis, the failure of models and the lack of capture of extreme exposures led regulators to change the way risks were measured either by requiring financial institutions to use particular families of distributions (Gaussian (BCBS (2005) ), sub-exponantial (EBA (2014b))), either by changing the way dependencies were captured (EBA (2014b)) or suggesting switching from the VaR (Value-at-Risk) 5 to sub-additive risk measures like the ES (Expected Shorfall) 6 (BCBS (2013)). Indeed, risk modelling had played a major role during the crisis which began in 2008 either as catalysts or triggers. The latest changes proposed by the authorities have been motivated by the will to come closer to the reality of the financial markets.
Before capturing dependencies, the choice of the probability distributions used to model the risks and their associated measures are key points for practitioners and regulators. From a technical point of view, it is now accepted that the most relevant piece of information for risk managers is contained in the tails of the distributions characterising the risk factors they are willing to control. Thus it appears sensible that regulators, following theoretical and empirical studies and evolution of the risks associated to markets, financial products and actors behaviours adjust 3 European Central Bank -Single Supervisor Mechanism 4 European Banking Authority 5 Given a confidence level p ∈ [0, 1], the VaR associated to a random variable X is given by the smallest number x such that the probability that X exceeds x is not larger than (1 − p) V aR (1−p)% = inf(x ∈ R : P (X > x) ≤ (1 − p)).
(1.1) their requirements. Nevertheless analysing in details these requests, we note -inside the guidelines -some confusions and misleading interpretations which cannot help to robustly evaluate and control these risks in financial institutions and also do not permit constructive exchanges between regulators and practitioners in order to reach the stability objective of the financial industry.
Thus, the purpose of this paper is to discuss some parts of the methodological framework proposed for risk modelling by the regulators and its evolution from 1995 to 2015, focusing on their strong incentive to use: (i) specific distributions to characterise the risks, (ii) specific risk measures, (iii) specific associated confidence level, and to apply these strategies independently from each others. We illustrate in the following that distributions, risk measures and confidence levels are three facets of a single object and are therefore indivisible. Thus, we argue that the approaches proposed by the regulators in the guidelines focusing on risk modelling engender a bias (positive or negative) in the computation of the risks, and consequently a distortion in the corresponding capital requirements, as soon as the problem of the measurement is not being dealt with in its globality.
Some of the following points are mainly addressed in this paper:
1. Is the choice of a particular risk measure ensures conservativeness? 2. What is the impact of the choice of a particular distribution on the associated risk measure?
3. For a single kind of risk: given a risk measure, what choice of the confidence level p is really appropriate?
4. When we use a V aR p measure, for which distributions is the sub-additivity 7 property fulfiled as soon as we consider several risk factors?
7 A coherent risk measure is a function ρ : L ∞ → R:
• Monotonicity:If X1, X2 ∈ L and X1 ≤ X2 then ρ(X1) ≤ ρ(X2)
• Sub-additivity: If X1, X2 ∈ L then ρ(X1 + X2) ≤ ρ(X1) + ρ(X2)
• Positive homogeneity: If λ ≥ 0 and X ∈ L then ρ(λX) = λρ(X)
• Translation invariance: ∀k ∈ R, ρ(X + k) = ρ(X) − k 3 Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne -2015.46 5. Given that each risk type is modelled considering different distributions and using different p-s, how can the sub-additivity criterion be fulfilled?
Questions raised by Regulatory proposals
For three categories of risks (market, credit 8 and operational), regulatory proposals regarding the choice of the distributions, the risk measures and the associated confidence level p are analysed.
Issues related to their implementation have been highlighted in the following.
Market risks
1 -In the BCBS (1995) document, it is explicitly written:"The Committee has examined carefully how banks' value-at-risk measures based on the parameters described above can be converted into a capital requirement that appropriately reflects the prudential concerns of supervisors. One of the problems of recognising banks' value-at-risk measures as an appropriate capital charge is that the assessments are based on historical data and that, even under a 99% confidence interval, extreme market conditions are excluded. The Committee does not believe that a ten-day value-at-risk measure provides sufficient comfort for the measurement of capital for a number of reasons, which include: the past is not always a good guide to the future; the assumptions about statistical "normality" built into some models may not be justified, i.e. there may be "fat tails" in the distribution curve; the correlations assumed in the model may prove to be incorrect; market liquidity may become inadequate to close out positions."
These proposals suggest several remarks concerning various very different concepts.
• First, the regulator says that the choice of the VaR as the risk measure excludes to take into account extreme events. This statement is not correct as the choice of the VaR is not the issue, it is the choice of the underlying distribution with which the associated quantile is evaluated that determines if the extreme events are captured or not. This question actually implied a second question about what is an extreme event as answering this question would suppose a complete information set.
• Second, the regulator discusses the inadequacy of using a "ten-day value at risk...." for the measurement of the capital. Indeed, it is generally an error to use "the ten-day value at risk" but the reasons evoked by the regulators are sources of confusion. The errors found their origins in two main issues, the choice of the model by the practitioners (independence between the risk factors) on the first hand, and the implied Gaussian behaviour of the risk models, on the other hand. It would be more appropriate from a practical point of view to invite practitioners to work in a more robust way investigating both the properties and the patterns of their data: (i) Are they independent or not? (ii) Whatever the answer to this first question, what is the most appropriate model (according to adequacy, conservativeness, or some other criteria)? (iii) How to capture the dependencies (not only between two risk factors using the concept of correlation which assumes also that there is some linearity between the risk factors, but a more general dependence architecture)? (iv)
What is "the" distribution characterising the data set (it can be Gaussian, fat tailed, thin tailed, asymmetric, symmetric, multimodal etc....)? (v) How to justify the choice of the probability distribution they retain?
• Third, the question of the choice of the information set is crucial, but saying that the use of historical data is "not a good way to work" is particularly dangerous. Indeed, the historical data set is the only original information set available for the modeler. Concerning this information set, a more relevant question is to decide the period the modeler has to use and the length of this period. Thus, there is a huge mis-understanding from the regulator concerning the information set the practitioners have to use : "good" data sets do not exist.
• Fourth, when regulators said that modellers need to capture market liquidity with the information set, it was only rhetorical. As soon as a market is illiquid it creates a systemic risk which is another problem, consequently the question of the definition of liquidity risk should be raised. Why did the regulator introduce this issue in 1995? A debate is largely opened on the concept and even in 2015, to our knowledge, it does not emerge a "correct"
and useful definition for this kind of risk in the literature, as the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) supposed to evaluate the buffer covering the risk of being illiquid converges to zero as soon as the market tends to dry up. Note that we will not address this issue in the following as it is out of scope of this paper, but it was worth mentioning it with respect to the question of the data set quality. This proposal is surprising and very restrictive looking at the modelling of dependencies between the risk factors. Indeed the Gaussian copula takes the same information in both tails (it does not consider that asymmetry between information sets can exist). Furthermore, it does not consider the importance of fat tails, which is not consistent with the behaviour of most risks observed on financial markets (especially during the crisis). Since 2011, a lot of research using copula (like the Archimeadean copula for instance) and vines which take asymmetrical behavior and information in the tails has been conducted. This remark, is interesting as a Gaussian copula structure correspond to the inverse of a multivariate Gaussian distribution. We see that once again the world seems Gaussian regulatory speaking. We are quickly illustrating the issue below, though we will see that it is not helping addressing issues related to risk measures.
3 -Nevertheless the regulator in the same document states (page 9): "The onus is on the bank to justify the modelling choices and their impact to the national supervisor. Normal distributions or normal copula may not be assumed uncritically. The impact of such modelling choices must be analysed in the validation."
One may wonder why regulators propose so restrictive models (Gaussian framework in the previous paragraph) to say after that they may not be good enough? Why not just giving the possibility to financial institutions to model the risk factors in the way they consider to be the best fit, and then rely on an independent validation process to validate their choice. 9
4 -In the Consultative Document concerning the Fundamental review of the trading book (BCBS (2013)) "A revised market risk framework", October 2013, Page 3, the Basel Committee proposes 9 We recall that the idea of a floor on some metrics (capital, etc.) has been mentioned and may also be relevant. This proposal remains very limited and a dangerous approach, even if some robust works can be done when practitioners compute the probability of default (PD) (Guégan et al. (2013) ), the loss given default (LGD) and the exposure of default (EAD). Using a Gaussian distribution even shifted considering the other parameters implies that the essence of the modelled risk has a Gaussian behaviour. Indeed, the intensity of default is transformed into a Gaussian quantile and somehow compared to the 99th percentile of the same Gaussian distribution. This is highly questionable and overly simplistic. What led to that conclusion? How is that possible to be backtested? This approach is nothing more than a transformed VaR. To the regulators' credit this model did not lead (yet) to massive failures, though low default portfolio credit risk modelling is currently being highly questioned.
Another issue that is worth mentioning but not dealt with in this paper is the independence between PD, LGD and EAD. This is not consitent with the piece of regulation requiering banks to capture wrong way risk, i.e. the upper tail dependence between PD and EAD (BCBS (2011a)). It appears that these proposals are problematic as some "norms" are defined for banks internal models even if these models are totally inadequate when we fit them to real data. Nowhere regulators or experts from regulatory institutions provide the assumptions which justify the use of such models or such methodology. How can we interpret this absence of justifications? Is that a political decision? If the answer is yes, then what are the objectives? It seems to be the will of a "one size fits all" approach to be able to compare banks risk management performance.
-In the
Unfortunately, if the model is inadequate, then the quality of the risk management will not be properly reflected and therefore the outcomes of the model misleading for both the authorities and the practitioners. Besides, it appears to be a bit despotic and to transfer the burden from the regulator onto the banks.
The credit value adjustment (CVA) is closely related to the evaluation of derivatives. The assumption is that models used to evaluate derivatives such as Black & Scholes as these models do not capture the risk of a counterparty defaulting. The CVA in its nature challenges the use of Gaussian like distributions as it questions the soundness of the risk neutral valuation.
Indeed the risk neutral valuation does not capture the risk of a counterparty to default, therefore an adjustment has been created to add a buffer in capital. The expected positive exposure (EPE) used to evaluate the CVA is quite interesting too, as a symmetrical distribution such as the Gaussian distribution is used to capture an asymetric exposure (positive) (Gregory (2012) ).
This does not seem very sensible. It seems that once again, the regulation implies the use of a particular distribution even if it is not appropriate except maybe to simplify the calculations. states that "the competent authority shall verify that an institution pays particular attention to the positive skewness and leptokurtosis of the data when selecting a severity distribution.
When the data are much dispersed in the tail, empirical curves shall not be used to estimate the tail region. Sub-exponential distributions shall be used for this purpose unless there exist exceptional reasons to apply other functions, which shall be in any case properly addressed and fully justified to prevent undue reduction of the capital figures." In Pages 17-18, "sub-exponential distributions" are defined as distributions whose right tail decreases slower than the exponential distribution. The class of sub-exponential distributions includes the lognormal, log-gamma, loglogistic, generalised Pareto, Burr, and Weibull (with shape parameter < 1) (Guégan and Hassani (2014) ). The Weibull (with shape parameter > 1) and gamma distributions do not belong to the class of Sub-exponential distributions. Sub-exponential distributions can better represent the shape of the data in the tail (other than their skewness in the body) by allowing estimates of parameters that do not depend on the higher order statistical moments".
Comparing the proposal for operational risk modelling (Guégan and Hassani (2009) , Guégan and Hassani (2013b) ) with proposals to model other types of risks, we observe that for operational risks, experts thinking is ahead, however, some questions should be raised.
• First, why is it forbidden to use "empirical curves" to fit the distributions? This notion which is not specified, probably refers to the non-parametric fit which can be used, avoiding the price to pay with analytical forms. It is a pity not inciting practitioners to use this technique because it is well known by modelers that non-parametric fittings when they are correctly conducted, provides better fits than any parametric distributions and is generally used as a benchmark.
• Second, it is difficult to understand -from a parametric point of view -why the regulators focus on the limited list of distributions and why they consider them "at the same level" knowing that they have specific behaviors which cannot take into account all the features of the risks, and also knowing that the methodologies to fit them are so different. On the other hand, this list cannot be exhaustive as there exist other classes of distributions (quite common) useful to fit these kinds of risks and the regulatory paper does not make any reference to them assuming that a good fit would be found anyway using the distributions enumerated. The approach is in our opinion far too restrictive.
• As it seems that there is a mis-understanding regarding the foundation of their proposals concerning this list of distributions, we provide here an alternative and complementary approach for the choice of the distributions the modelers can use. If we consider the class of sub-exponential distributions and in particular those listed in the document we can say that from a probabilistic and statistical point of view, these distributions have very different properties. The generalised Pareto distribution belongs to the class of extreme value distribution and is fitted on data sets selected above a certain threshold. The Weibull distribution belongs to the class of extreme value distributions through the Theorem of Fisher-Tippett (Fisher and Tippett (1928) ) appearing as the max -distribution for a certain class of distributions. In practice we will fit this distribution on data sets built from the original data using block maxima method selecting the maxima inside the original data set. The other distributions, if they present any interest in risk modelling (what about the Burr distribution?) will be fitted on the whole sample. In fine, there is a lot of confusion for the choice of these distributions. It would be more interesting to introduce and classify correctly the classes of distributions they propose for their use in practice. Indeed, a large panel of classes of distributions can be considered: the Generalised Hyperbolic (GH) Class of distributions (Barndorff-Nielsen (1977) ), the α-stable distributions (Samorodnitsky and Taqqu (1994)), the g-and h distributions (Hoaglin (1985) ) from one hand, and the extreme value distributions (Weibull, Fréchet, Gumbel) , and the GPD distributions on the other hand. It is important to make a distinction between these two classes of distributions because the former ones are fitted on the whole sample and the latter ones on some specific sub-samples which is fundamental in terms of risk management. Note also that the techniques of estimations differ for all these classes of distributions. Indeed, we use the whole sample (original data set) to estimate the GH, α-stable and g-and-h distributions, and maximum likelihood procedures will be used; Hill and Pickand methods are considered for estimating the parameters of the GPD distributions, and maximum likelihood method associated with block maxima methodology is used for the extreme value classes of distributions. The choice of the distributions cannot be split from the difficulty to estimate its parameters and the underlying information set. For instance the GPD distribution is very difficult to fit on nearly all data set because of the estimation of the threshold which is a key parameter for this class of distributions and whose estimate is generally very unstable. An error in its estimation can create error, distortion and confusion on the allocation of the capital. It is surprising that the regulators do not take into account these issues before imposing such distributions. Their proposal is worthy of a Prévert setting but, unfortunately, does not correspond to a robust approach.
2 -In the same document (page 17, item 24), regulators discuss the choice of risk measure:"risk measure means a single statistic extracted from the aggregated loss distribution at the desired confidence level, such as Value at Risk (VaR), or shortfall measures (e.g. Expected Shortfall,
This definition is particularly limitative. How the risk measures computed for different factors with different levels can be aggregated? Does the regulator has in mind the use of a spectral measure, then how can we use it? This would be interesting but the concept has never been discussed in any regulatory document. Thus, how robust is the method proposed?
To summarise
While these documents are addressing the main issues, we believe that some documents are too prescriptive, preventing banks from going beyond the proposals and focusing more on the capital calculations than the risk management itself. Regarding the calculation of the capital requirement from the knowledge of the risk factors, the main points concerns the choice of the distribution, the choice of the risk measure and the choice of p. The regulator would like to impose some choices. In the previous subsection these ones and the strategies to evaluate the risks independently from each other are questioned. Consequently, in the following we discuss the distributions suggested in the regulatory documents to model the risks and we analyse the soundness of the risk measures and a priori confidence levels associated to these ones.
Alternative strategies to the regulatory papers
In the previous Section, the methodological choices implied by the regulation have been presented and discussed, focusing on the nature of the distributions used to characterise a risk, the type of risk measure and the dependence structure to be applied. We point out some confusion and mis-understanding concerning the proposals of the regulators for these very technical points which are fundamental for the risk management of a banking institution as soon as these choices are determinant in the computation of the capital requirements, i.e. these should be risk sensitive. Thus, in this Section, using some data sets we illustrate and highlight the impact of these choices on practitioners 10 perceptions of a risk.
Data set and strategy
We have selected a data set provided by a Tier European bank representing "Execution, Delivery and Process Management" risks from 2009 to 2013. "Execution, Delivery and Process Management" risk is a sub-category of operational risk. This data set is characterized by a distribution right skewed (positive skewness) and leptokurtic.
In order to follow regulators' requirements in their different guidelines, we choose to fit on this data set some of the distributions proposed inside the regulatory documents and also others which seem more appropriate regarding the properties of the data set. We retain seven distribu-tions. They are estimated (i) on the whole sample: the lognormal distribution (asymmetric and medium tailed), the Weibull distribution (asymmetric and thin tailed), a Generalised Hyperbolic (GH) distribution (symetric or asymmetric, fat tailed on an infinite support), an Alpha-Stable distribution (symmetric, fat tailed on an infinite support), a Generalised Extreme value (GEV) distribution (asymmetric and fat tailed), (ii) on an adequate subset: the Generalised Pareto (GPD) distribution (asymmetric, fat tailed) calibrated on a set built over a threshold, a Generalised Extreme value (GEVbm) distribution (asymmetric and fat tailed ) fitted using maxima coming from the original set. The whole data set contains 98082 data points, the sub-sample used to fit the GPD contains 2943 data points and the sub-sample used to fit the GEV using the block maxima approach contains 3924 data points. The objective of these choices is to evaluate the impact of the selected distributions on the risk representation, i.e. how the initial empirical exposures are captured and transformed by the model. Table 1 exhibits parameters' estimates for each distribution selected 11 . The parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood, except for the GPD which implied a POT (Guégan et al. (2011)) approach and the GEV fitted on the maxima of the data set (maxima obtained using a block maxima method (Gnedenko (1943)) ). The quality of the adjustment is measured using both the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and the Anderson-Darling tests. The results presented in Table 1 show that none of the distribution is adequate. This is usually the case when fitting unimodal distributions to multimodal data set. Indeed, multimodality of the distributions is a frequent issue modelling operational risks as the risk categories combine multiple kinds of incident, for instance, a category combining external fraud will contain the fraud card on the body, commercial paper fraud in the middle, cyber attack and Ponzi scheme in the tail. the question of multi-modality becomes more and more important concerning the fitting of any data set. In this paper we do not discuss this issue in more details as it is out of the scope of our objective as the regulators never suggest this approach: we provide some discussion on this methodological aspect of risk modelling in the conclusion (some references are for instance,
Wang (2000) or Guégan and Hassani (2015a) ).
Using this data set and the fit of the seven distributions, we compute for each distribution the • To obtain VaR p (X +Y ), another approach is adopted. In a first step we randomly generate X and Y using the distribution fitted previously. Then X and Y are aggregated. The resulting cumulative distribution function is built and its inverse provide the spectrum of
The results are provided in the Tables 4 to 15 . We also illustrate these last results by graphes:
they are given in Figures 1 to 7 . We analyse now the results of these tables and Figures.
VaR
In this Section we analyse the results presented in Second, given p, between the four distributions fitted on the whole sample (for instance lognormal, Weibull, GH and alpha-stable), compared to the GPD fitted above a threshold, we observe a huge difference for the VaR. A change in the threshold may either give higher or lower values depending, therefore the VaR is highly sensitive to the value of the threshold. Now, comparing the result obtained on the GEV fitted on the whole sample to the GEV fitted on the bock maxima, we observe the one focusing on the tails (GEV block maxima) leads to lower VaRs than a GEV capturing the entire set of information. Therefore, a more conservative information set associated to the appropriate distribution may lead to a lower VaR. The number of blocks considered may have some impact but nothing comparable to the effect of the threshold on a GPD. The Weibull which is a distribution contained in the GEV provides the lowest VaR. So, as presented earlier, we randomly generated values from the distribution fitted before and combined them two by two. By way of this process we generated some random correlations and as a matter of fact some diversification. Then, we compared the risk measures obtained from the combination of random variables and the sum of the risk measures computed on the random variables taken independently. Figures 1 to 5 represents the spectra of these two items and consequently allows comparing the risk measure obtained for different confidence levels.
These figures show that depending on the combinations of distributions, the VaR may always be sub-additive, never sub-additive, only sub-additive in the tails, only sub-additive in the body or may be more erratic, i.e. can be sub-additive initially, then become non-sub-additive, and finally become sub-additive again in the tails. These observations are supported by Tables 12 to 14 .
Tables 14 also show the impact of the discretisation of the distributions on the risk measures, as this impact the sub-additivity. This last property is not only associated to the choice of the risk measure but definitively to the choice of the distribution and of the confidence level?
Analysing the results in details, we see in Table 4 , for p fixed, that the VaR is never sub-additive if the lognormal distribution is associated to a GPD, while if the lognormal distribution is associated to any of the others, the VaR is usually sub-additive in the tails but not at the end of the body part. Note that if the lognormal is associated with an identical lognormal, the differences we have observed are only due to numerical errors related to the sampling. We expect the two values to be absolutely identical. Though, it is interesting to note that the random generation of numbers can be the root cause of non sub-additive results. Identical analysis can be done on other combinations (see table 6 ). Looking at Table 6 it appears that when the GPD has a positive location parameter, this prevents any combination from being sub-additive, because by construction the 0th percentile of the GPD is equal to the location parameter which should be according to Pickand's theorem (Pickands (1975) ), sufficiently high. At the 95th percentile, the VaR is always sub-additive as soon as a lognormal distribution is involved except if it is combined with a GPD. For the other distributions, it is not always true. For example, the VaR obtained combining a Weibull and a GEV fitted on the whole sample is not sub-additive. Table   7 shows that the use of an Alpha-Stable combined with any other distribution except the GPD provides sub-additive risk measures at the 99% level.
In Parallel, Figures 1 to 5 allows a more discriminating analysis of the behaviour of the compo-
In Figure 1 , we show that the sub-additivity property is only verified for high percentile when we use a combination of a Weibull and a GH distributions, i.e. for p > 90%. Besides, the gap tends to enlarge as the percentiles increase. 
Expected Shortfall
In this Section the results of the Table 3 The ES calculations are linked to the distribution used to model the underlying risks. Looking at Table 2 , at the 95%, we observe that the ES goes from 18 for the Weibull to 216 127 for the GPD. Therefore, depending on the distribution used to model the same risk, at the same p level, the ES obtained is completely different. The corollary of that issue is that the ES obtained for a given distribution at a lower percentile will be higher than the ES computed on another distribution at a higher percentile. For example, Table 2 show that the 90% ES obtained from an Alpha-Stable distribution is much higher than the 99.9% ES computed on a lognormal distribution.
The comments regarding the impact of the choice of the information sets on the calculation of the considered risk measure are identical to those stated in the third paragraph of the previous section except regarding 2 points. First, results obtained from the GPD and the alpha-stable distribution are of the same order. Second, the differences between the GPD and the GEV fitted on the block maxima are huge, illustrating the fact that despite being two extreme value distributions, the information captured is quite different.
Regarding the sub-additivity issue, by building the ES always lead to sub-additive values, contrary to the VaR for which this property is not always verified and depends on the underlying distribution. It is interesting to note that if we combine two ES taken at two different levels of confidence p, the ES may not be sub-additive anymore. This is a point that the regulator does not discuss when he says that we have to aggregate the risk measures. This issue is particularly important for risk managers, as soon as the level of confidence prescribed in the regulation guidelines is different from a risk factor to another and appears totally arbitrary.
While the use of several confidence levels p i , i = 1, · · · , k allowing to have a spectral representation of the risk measure (VaR or ES) could be interesting but the approach proposed by the regulator which mixes distribution and confidence level is questionable. Indeed, the 70% ES of some combinations may lead to much higher value that the 99.9th (Table 9 , WE-GPD vs WE-GH).
VaR vs Expected Shortfall
Previously we illustrate the fact that, depending on the distribution used and the confidence level chosen, the values provided by VaR p can be bigger than the values derived for an ES p and conversely. Thus a question arises: What should we use the VaR or the Expected Shortfall? To answer to this question we can consider several points:
• Conservativeness: Regarding that point, the choice of the risk measure is only relevant for a given distribution, i.e. for any given distribution the VaR p will always be inferior to the ES p (assuming only positive values) for a given p. But, if the distribution used to characterise the risk is to be chosen and fitted, then it may happen that for a given level p, the VaR p obtained from a distribution is superior to the ES p . For example Table 2 shows that the 99.9% VaR obtained using the GEV distribution fitted with block maxima is superior to the ES obtained for any other distribution at the same level p.
• Sub-additivity: In that case only the expected shortfall guarantees always the sub-additivity of the measure as soon as the p is set, but for some distributions the VaR can be also sub-additive.
• Distribution and p impacts: • Parameterisation and estimation: the impact of the calibration of the estimates of the parameters is not negligible (Guégan et al. (2011) ), mainly when we fit a GPD. Indeed in that latter case, due to the instability of the estimates for the threshold, the practitioners can largely overfit the risks. Thus, why the regulators still impose this distribution?
Conclusion and Recommendations
In the introduction, analysing several guidelines issued by the EBA and the Basel Committee, we pointed out the fact that the regulators impose specific distributions, risk measures and confidence levels to analyse the risk factors in order to evaluate the capital requirements of financial
institutions. It appears that their approach is non holistic and their analysis of the risks relies on a disconnection between the choice of the distributions, the risk measures and the confidence level, tools necessary for risks assessments.
In this paper we show that the risk measurement for financial institutions depends intrinsically on how the tools are chosen, i.e. the distribution, the combinations of these distributions, the type of risk measure and the level of confidence. Therefore, the existence of a risk measure as discussed in the regulation is questionable, as for example modifying the level of confidence by a few percents would result in completely different interpretations. The regulators fail to propose an appropriate approach to measure these risks in financial institutions as soon as they do not take into account the problem of risk modelling in its globality.
Regulators are by far too prescriptive and their choices questionable:
• Imposing distributions makes no sense whatever the risks to be modeled. Where are these a priori coming from?
• The regulation reflect some misunderstanding of distributions' properties (probabilist approach) and of the particular properties surrounding their fitting (statistical approach).
• The levels of confidence p seems rather arbitrary. They neither take into account the flexibility of risk measures nor the impact of the underlying distribution, misleading risk managers.
While these fundamental problems are not addressed, others are completely ignored such as the concept of spectral analysis, or of distortion risk measures (Sereda et al. (2010) , Guégan and Hassani (2015a)). Despite the cosmetic changes included in Basel II and III, the propositions do not enable a better risk management, and banks response to regulatory points are not appropriate as they do not correspond to the reality. It is therefore not surprising that capital calculations and stress testing are still unclear, and that these are not able to capture asymmetric chocs corresponding an extreme incident (black swan, dinosaur or dragon).
Some other questions should also be addressed:
• Is that more efficient in terms of risk management to measure the risk and then build a capital buffer or to adjust the risk taken considering the capital we have? In other word, maybe should banks start optimising their income generation with respect to the capital they already have.
• The previous points are all based on unimodal parametric distributions to characterise each risk factor, what is the impact of using multimodal distributions in terms of risk measurement and management? We believe that an empirical evaluation of the risk provides bank with a reliable benchmark and a starting point in term of what would be an acceptable capital charge or risk assessment.
• One of the biggest issue lies in the fact that we do not know how to combine or aggregate • While in this paper we focused on each factor taken independently, the question of the dependence is quite important too. Maybe not as important as the impact of the distribution selected for the risk factor (Guégan and Hassani (2013a) ) but non addressing this issue properly could lead to a mis-interpretation of the results. The choice of the copula has a direct impact on the dependence structure we would like to apply and the capture of shocks. For instance, a Gaussian or Student t-copula is symmetric, despite the fact that a t-copula with a low number of degrees of freedom could capture tail dependencies, these would not capture asymmetric shocks. Archimedean or Extrema Value copulas associated to a vines strategy would be more appropriate (Guégan and Maugis (2010) ).
• In a situation such as depicted by a stress-testing process with forward looking perspective, if the risks are not correctly measured then the foundations will be very fragile and the outcome of the exercise not reliable. Indeed, stressing a situation requires an appropriate initial assessment of the real exposure, otherwise the stress would merely model what should have been captured originally and therefore be useless (Bensoussan et al. (2015) , Guégan and Hassani (2015b) , Hassani (2015)).
We came up to the conclusion that the debate related to the selection of a risk measure over another is not really relevant, and considering issues raised in the previous sections our main recommendation would be to leave as much flexibility as possible to the modellers to build the most appropriate models for risk management purposes initially and then extended with conservative buffers for capital purposes. The idea would be to bring the idea that a good risk management would mechanically limit the exposure and the losses and therefore ultimately reduce the regulatory capital burden. Models should only be a reflexion of the underlying risk framework and not a tool to justify a reduced capital charge. We would like to see more the supervisory face of the authorities and less their regulatory one, in other words we would like them to stop focusing so much on banks risk measurement comparability and more on financial institutions risk understanding. It would probably be wise if both regulators and risk managers were working together (e.g., academic formation open to both corpus, regular workshops, etc., (Guégan (2009) )) instead as opponents in order to reach their objective of stability of the financial system for the first and profitability for the second. The random variable X has been generated using a Weibull distribution and Y has been obtained from a Generalised Hyberbolic distribution. The percentiles represented are the 70th, 80th, 90th, 95th, 99th, 99.5th and 99.9th. For high percentiles, the VaR seems to be sub-additive. The random variable X has been generated using a Alpha-stable distribution and Y has been obtained from a GEV distribution calibrated on maxima. The percentile represented are the 70th, 80th, 90th, 95th, 99th, 99.5th and 99.9th. For high percentiles, the VaR is not sub-additive. (black). The random variable X has been generated using a Alpha-stable distribution and Y has been obtained from a GEV distribution calibrated on maxima. The percentiles represented are sequentially going from the 10th to the 70th with a step of 1% between two points. The VaR represented are never sub-additive.
